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RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2:
Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate
forever; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil
cases in the manner to be prescribed by lnv. The legislature may
provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not
less than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case. A jury trial may
be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except those in
which the crime charged may be punishable by death, by a
written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open
court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court
having jurisdiction to try the offense. The legislature may enact
laws, not inconsistent hereivith, governing the form, content,
manner and time of presentation of the instrument effectuating
such waiver.
N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 18:
Trial by jury is guaranteed as provided in article one of this
constitution. The legislature may provide that in any court of
original jurisdiction a jury shall be composed of six or of twelve
persons and may authorize any court which shall have
jurisdiction over crimes and other violations of law, other than
crimes prosecuted by indictment, to try such matters without a
jury, provided, however, that crimes prosecuted by indictment
shall be tried by a jury composed of twelve persons, unless a jury
trial has been waived as provided in section two of article one of
this constitution.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed....
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COURT OF APPEALS
Sharrow v. Dick1
(decided June 14, 1995)
The issue in this case was whether the appellant's constitutional
right to a trial by jury2 had been violated because the trial court
erred in denying his counsel's request to conduct a limited
inquiry to determine whether all six jurors participated in the
deliberation of the issues submitted to them. 3 The court of
appeals held that "where the parties to a civil case have not
1. 86 N.Y.2d 54, 653 N.E.2d 1150, 629 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1995).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed ... " Id. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. This section
states:
Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by
constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial
may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be
prescribed by law. The legislature may provide, however, by law, that a
verdict may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury in any
civil case. A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal
cases, except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by
death, by a written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open
court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court
having jurisdiction to try the offense. The legislature may enact laws,
not inconsistent herewith, governing the form, content, manner and time
of presentation of the instrument effectuating such waiver.
Id. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 18. This section states:
Trial by jury is guaranteed as provided in article one of this constitution.
The legislature may provide that in any court of original jurisdiction a
jury shall be composed of six or of twelve persons and may authorize
any court which shall have jurisdiction over crimes and other violations
of law, other than crimes prosecuted by indictment, to try such matters
without a jury, provided, however, that crimes prosecuted by indictment
shall be tried by a jury composed of twelve persons, unless a jury trial
has been waived as provided in section two of article one of this
constitution.
Id.
3. Sharrow, 86 N.Y.2d at 56-57, 653 N.E.2d at 1150, 629 N.Y.S.2d at
980.
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agreed to a trial by fewer than six jurors, a valid verdict requires
that all six jurors participate in the underlying deliberations." 4
The court held that, in the absence of any inquiry regarding juror
participation, the possibility remains that the defendant's
constitutional right to trial by a six-member jury was
compromised and, accordingly, a new trial was ordered. 5 The
court granted this relief because parties are entitled to a process
in which each juror deliberates on all the issues and then, with
his or her individual judgment and persuasion, attempts to
influence the reasoning of the other five.6 If a juror disagrees
with the remaining five on one issue, he must still participate in
the deliberations or the jury will not meet the constitutional
requirements necessary for a valid verdict. 7
Lyndon Sharrow, plaintiff, was an iron worker employed by G
& H Steel, a third party defendant. 8 Sharrow was injured while
using a Genie Hoist during construction of the Southport
Correctional Facility. 9 He brought this action against the general
contractor, Dick Corporation, and Southern Steel Corporation,
the subcontractor, alleging a violation of New York Labor Law
section241(6)10 and common law negligence.11 The Dick
Corporation and Southern Steel successfully moved for summary
judgment against G & H Steel for common law and contractual
4. Id. at 59-60, 653 N.E.2d at 1152, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
5. Id. at 62, 653 N.E.2d at 1153, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
6. Id. at 60, 653 N.E.2d at 1152, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 57, 653 N.E.2d at 1150, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
9. Id.
10. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 241(6) (McKinney 1986). Section 241(6) provides
that:
All areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being
performed shall be so constructed, shored, equipped, guarded,
arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate
protection and safety to the persons employed therein or lawfuly
frequenting such places. The board may make rules to carry into effect
the provisions of this subdivision, and the owners of one and two family
dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, shall
comply therewith.
Id.
11. Sharrow, 86 N.Y.2d at 57, 653 N.E.2d at 1151, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 981.
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indemnification and, thus, the remaining issue at trial was
whether defendants had violated the Labor Law. 12
When the jury foreperson announced the verdict "finding
defendants' violation of the statute the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries and awarding him damages in the amount of
$430,000[,] [c]ounsel for G & H Steel requested that the jury be
polled." 1 3 Normally, the jury verdict is read to the jury and then
each juror is questioned as to whether that verdict is his or her
verdict. 14 In the instant case the court clerk departed from the
usual practice and polled the jury "by reading each question on
the verdict sheet and then asking each juror in turn to state his or
her verdict on the question." 15 When the clerk asked the first
question--"whether there was a violation of the Labor Law for
which the defendants were liable -- juror No. 5 stated that her
answer was 'No.'" 16 The clerk then followed with the second
question--"whether the Labor Law violation was the proximate
cause of plaintiffs injuries." 17 The following excerpt from the
transcript indicates juror No. 5's response:
JUROR NUMBER FIVE: I had no--
THE CLERK: Your verdict is no?
THE COURT: Well, she didn't make a determination because she
did not move on. 18
With regard to the third question the transcript indicates that
juror No. 5 did not respond immediately. 19 The question
involved the "total amount of damages necessary to compensate
plaintiff. "20 The transcript indicates juror No. 5's reply:
THE CLERK: Number 5? No response?
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. n. 1 (citation omitted).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 58, 653 N.E.2d at 1151, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 981.
20. Id.
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JUROR NUMBER FIVE: No.2 1
Juror No. 5 also replied "No response" to the remaining three
questions which involved "specific items of damages and
plaintiff's possible negligence." 22
Prior to the jury being discharged and after the polling, counsel
for G & H Steel suggested that juror number five's responses
could indicate that she had not participated in any of the
deliberations after the first question. 23 Counsel further suggested
that G & H Steel may have been deprived of its constitutional
right to a jury trial ause of this non-participation, and requested
that the trial court conduct a limited inquiry to determine the
extent of juror No. 5's participation in the verdict. 24 The trial
court denied this request and judgment was entered for
plaintiff.25
The primary issue before the court of appeals in Dick v.
Sharrow involved the question of whether a unanimous verdict
rendered by five jurors is as valid as a verdict rendered by five-
sixths of a six member jury.26 In deciding this question, the court
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 58, 653 N.E.2d 1153, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 982. The court, in
considering appellant's claim, examined the historical development of the right
to a trial by jury from the common law to its present form. Id. at 59-60, 653
N.E.2d at 1152, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 982. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (stating
that in New York, as provided by the New York State Constitution, a five-
sixth jury verdict in a civil case is permissible); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R.
4104 (McKinney 1992) (stating that a civil "jury shall be composed of six
persons"); N.Y. Cirv. PRAC. L & R. 4113(a) (McKinney 1992) (providing that
in a civil action "a verdict may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of
jurors constituting a jury"). See also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276,
288 (1930) (stating that the constitutional right to trial by jury at common law
requires "(1) that the jury should consist of twelve men, neither more nor less;
(2) that the trial shall be in the presence of and under the superintendence of a
judge having power to instruct [the jury] as to the law and advise them in
respect of the facts; and that the verdict shall be unanimous"); Cancemi v.
People, 18 N.Y. 128, 135 (1858) (stating that "[a] legal jury, according to the
common law, consists of twelve persons"(citation omitted)).
1996] 1093
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first addressed appellant's claim that the trial court erred in
declining to conduct a limited inquiry to determine whether juror
No. 5 participated in the verdict process. 27 In determining
whether a unanimous verdict rendered by five jurors is as valid
as a verdict rendered by five-sixths of a six-member jury, the
appellate courts have consistently held that, absent the express
consent of the parties, an individual's right to a jury of six
persons sworn to try the issues must not be diminished, and that
all six jurors must participate in the deliberations leading to the
verdict.2 8
Finding that the constitutional right to a jury trial had been
violated, the Sharrow court held that:
27. Sharrow, 86 N.Y.2d at 56, 653 N.E.2d at 1150, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
28. See Waldman v. Cohen, 125 A.D.2d 116, 512 N.Y.S.2d 205 (2d
Dep't 1987). In a civil suit where the number of jurors available for
deliberations fell to five on the morning of summations and defendants did not
consent to the five-person jury, the appellate court ruled that the verdict
rendered by the jury was void. Id. at 117, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 206. The Waldman
court further stated that "[i]n a civil case, a verdict rendered by a jury
consisting of fewer than six jurors is a nullity in the absence of consent by all
parties." Id. See also Schabe v. Hampton Bays Union Free Sch. Dist., 103
A.D.2d 418, 480 N.Y.S.2d 328 (2d Dep't 1984). The appellate court
determined that in a case involving a special verdict all answers approved by a
five-sixths vote need not have the concurrence of the identical five jurors. Id.
at 427, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 335. The court also held that where a juror has
dissented from the answer to a special verdict question he or she is not bound
by the answer as further questions are considered. Id at 429, 480 N.Y.S.2d at
336; Measeck v. Noble, 9 A.D.2d 19, 189 N.Y.S.2d 748 (3d Dep't 1959). In
Measeck, the Third Department stated that:
In the absence of stipulation or consent on the record to receive a
verdict of less than the constituted number (12), the verdict of the jury
was a nullity.... [T]he addition of Section 463-a was never intended to
amend or alter this basic principle. This amendment made by the 1938
Constitutional Convention that "a verdict may be rendered by not less
than five-sixths of the jurors constituting a jury in any civil case" was to
overcome the number of disagreements in civil actions. It did not
change the quantum as to what constitutes a legal jury but only the
quantum as to the rendering of a verdict not unanimous by a legally
constituted jury.
Id. at 21, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 750 (emphasis supplied).
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[W]here the parties to a civil case have not agreed to a trial by
fewer than six jurors, a valid verdict requires that all six jurors
participate in the underlying deliberations. The parties are
entitled to a process in which each juror deliberates on all issues
and attempts to influence with his or her individual judgment and
persuasion the reasoning of the other five.2 9
The court further stated that although a juror may disagree with
the remaining five regarding the issue of liability, he or she must
still participate in the deliberations. 30 If the juror were to cease
this involvement, the jury would become a body of five which is
one less than the required six and the verdict would, therefore, be
void.3 1
The Sharrow court further concluded that the request for a
limited inquiry of the jury should have been granted by the trial
court in order to resolve the doubts raised by the juror's response
to the poll. 32 The limited inquiry would have assisted the court in
determining if juror No. 5 had participated in all of the jury
deliberations in order to decide if the verdict was flawed. 33
29. Sharrow, 86 N.Y.2d at 59-60, 653 N.E.2d at 1152, 629 N.Y.S.2d at
982. See Arizmendi v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 753, 437 N.E.2d 274,
452 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1982) (finding that appellants were effectively deprived of
their constitutional guarantee of a jury of six persons when, after a poll, a
juror revealed that he had neither voted nor deliberated on the issue of
damages because he was the sole dissenter on the issue of liability; however,
the court also found the objection was waived by defendants because the issue
was first raised in a post trial motion); see also Schabe v. Hampton Bays
Union Free School Dist., 103 A.D.2d 418, 427-28, 480 N.Y.S.2d 328, 335
(2d Dep't 1984) (discussing the importance of juror participation in the
decision-making process of jury deliberations regardless of whether the juror
opposes or agrees with the majority decision).
30. Sharrow, 86 N.Y.2d at 60, 653 N.E.2d at 1152, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
31. Id. (citation omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id. See Porrett v. City of New York, 252 N.Y. 208, 211, 169 N.E.
280 (1929) (stating that where the jury verdict appears to be "imperfect or
incomplete" the court may order the jurors to retire and consider the matter
again); Pogo Holding Corp. v. New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 97
A.D.2d 503, 467 N.Y.S.2d 872, affid, 62 N.Y.2d 969, 468 N.E.2d 291, 479
N.Y.S.2d 336 (2d Dep't 1983) (citing Porret and finding that "judicial
intervention is authorized where there is substantial confusion or ambiguity in
the verdict").
1996] 1095
7
et al.: Right to a Jury Trial
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
Moreover, if there had been a questionable verdict the inquiry
would have allowed the trial court the option of either correcting
the inadequacy before discharging the jury or ordering a new trial
if no other remedy was available. 34 In granting a limited inquiry,
the court distinguished between conducting such an inquiry prior
to discharging the jury from one done post-trial. 35
New York and federal law are similar in recognizing the right
of the trial court to conduct some form of inquiry into the validity
of a verdict or indictment. 36 In most jurisdictions, a post-trial
inquiry into the validity of a jury verdict is subject to the
provisions of Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 37
However, in New York, despite the consistency of the case law
with these provisions, a similar statute has not been adopted. 38
34. Sharrow, 86 N.Y.2d at 60, 653 N.E.2d at 1152, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
See Barry v. Manglass, 55 N.Y.2d 803, 806, 432 N.E.2d 125, 127, 447
N.Y.S.2d 423, 425 (1981) (stating that had the court been aware of the
possibility of an inconsistent verdict prior to discharging the jury, the trial
court could have taken a corrective action such as directing the jury to
reconsider its decision).
35. Id. at 60, 653 N.E.2d at 1153, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
36. Id. at 61.
37. Id. at 60; FED. R. EviD. 606(b). Rule 606(b) provides that:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit
or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about
which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these
purposes.
Id.
38. Sharrow, 86 N.Y.2d at 60, 653 N.E.2d at 1153, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
See Kaufman v. Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 460, 482 N.E.2d 63, 70, 492
N.Y.S.2d 584, 591 (1985) (applying the policy reasons stated by the Supreme
Court in McDonald, see infra note 40, and denying a request to depose jurors
from several prior related cases); People v. DeLucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 277-80,
229 N.E.2d 211, 213-14, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528-30 (1967) (discussing the
differences between the applicability of the traditional common law rule and
1096 [Vol 12
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Rule 606(b) provides that "a juror may not testify as to any
matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations except in cases when an inquiry into external
influences on the jury is necessary." 39 The policy considerations
underlying this nile were first expressed by the United States
Supreme Court in McDonald v. Pless.40 The Sharrow court
identified three factors that the Supreme Court, in McDonald,
recognized as pertinent in making a post-trial determination of
the admissibility of juror evidence impeaching a quotient verdict:
"ensuring the finality of verdicts, preventing juror harassment by
disappointed litigants or their attorneys, and encouraging
'frankness and freedom of discussion and conference' among the
jurors."41
the constitutional protection provided in the federal courts and concluding that
the rule against impeachment of jury verdicts is necessary to prevent the
harassment of jurors and to prevent the potential for "chaos" an alternative
rule may cause); People v. Redd, 164 A.D.2d 34, 36-40, 561 N.Y.S.2d 439,
440-42 (1st Dep't 1991) (applying policy considerations established by the
Supreme Court regarding juror testimony in order to impeach a verdict); Russo
v. Jess R. Rivkin, 113 A.D.2d 570, 574-75, 497 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44-45 (2d
Dep't 1985) (citing prior case law on the issue of jury impeachment to support
the court in its decision to rule against the admission of juror testimony to
impeach a verdict); Gamell v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 40 A.D.2d 1010, 1011-12,
339 N.Y.S.2d 31, 33-34 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 32 N.Y.2d 678, 296
N.E.2d 256, 343 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1972) (citing previous Supreme Court
holdings in its condemnation of the practice of post-trial investigations
conducted in order to impeach a jury verdict).
39. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
40. 238 U.S. 264 (1915). In McDonald, the Supreme Court stated that:
When the affidavit of a juror, as to the misconduct of himself or the
other members of the jury, is made the basis or a motion for a new trial
the court must choose between redressing the injury of the private
litigant and inflicting the public injury which would result if jurors were
permitted to testify as to what had happened in the jury room.
Id. at 267.
41. Sharrow, 86 N.Y.2d at 60, 653 N.E.2d at 1153, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 983
(citing McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267-68). See Tanner v. United States, 483
U.S. 107, 119-20 (1987) (supporting the Court's holding in McDonald and
noting the importance of protecting jury deliberations from public scrutiny);
Mark Cammack, The Jurisprudence of Jury Trials: The No Impeachment Rule
and the Conditions for Legitimate Legal Decisionmaking, 64 U. COLO. L.
1996] 1097
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The Sharrow court concluded that none of these policies is
threatened when prior to discharging the jury the trial court
allows an inquiry into "an inconsistency or ambiguity in the
jury's verdict that is apparent from the juror's responses during
polling." 42 Therefore, the court concluded that in the instant case
there existed an ambiguity which correctly led defense counsel to
request a limited inquiry to resolve the issue of whether juror
No. 5 participated in the jury verdict. 43 The court further held
that the failure of the trial court to grant such an inquiry leaves
open the possibility that the defendant's constitutional right to a
trial by a full six-member jury was compromised and, therefore,
a new trial was ordered. 44
REv. 57 (1993) (discussing the origin, application of, and alternatives to the no
impeachment rule).
42. Sharrow, 86 N.Y.2d at 61, 653 N.E.2d at 1153, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
See People v. Pickett, 61 N.Y.2d 773, 461 N.E.2d 294, 473 N.Y.S.2d 157
(1984). The Pickett court established guidelines for conducting a juror inquiry
as follows:
[The trial judge should address] the juror out of the presence of the
other jurors, instructing her that communications among the jurors that
were a part of their deliberative process in attempting to reach a verdict
on the issues they were charged to decide (including their efforts by
permissible arguments on the merits to persuade each other) were secret
and not to be disclosed to him.
Id. at 774, 461 N.E.2d at 295, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 158. See State v. Drowne,
602 A.2d 540, 543-44 (R.I. 1992) (adopting the guidelines set forth in Pickett
and further requiring that "only the trial justice in the presence of opposing
counsel examine the juror, and that in no circumstances should counsel be
allowed to question the juror").
43. Sharrow, 86 N.Y.2d at 60, 653 N.E.2d at 1153, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
44. Id.
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